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ABSTRACT

Debate paradigms, which at one time established standards to help judges evaluate arguments and rules to guide debaters' argument choice and strategy selection, no longer offer consistent guidance for either judges or debaters. An increased emphasis on creativity and flexibility has led to a general unwillingness to use a rigid debate format. The communication theory (CMM) advanced by W. Barnett Pearce and Vernon E. Cronen, however, provides the basis for a flexible yet clearly communicated debate framework. Often referred to as "rules theory," CMM describes two types of rules: constitutive--which govern the assignment of meaning, and regulative--which define parameters for acceptable strategy choices within a given context. As applied to debate, this theory suggests that meaning, being both cognitive and context-dependent, is determined by six general hierarchical levels of organization: (1) content of the argument, (2) type of argument, (3) episode of communication or debate round, (4) perceived relationships between judge and debaters and among the debaters, (5) perceived role of debaters or judge, and (6) archetypal patterns of the debate community. By teaching debaters to coordinate the management of meaning in a debate round, coaches give them tools of perceptual management that can be used in a wide variety of situations. (MM)

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Academic Debate Paradigms: An Examination From a Rules Perspective

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A paper submitted to the Central States Speech Convention, Lincoln, Nebraska

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I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Dr. Kenneth M. Johnson for his guidance on this project. The opinions presented and any errors contained herein are however, my own.

*Director of Forensics, Auburn University, Alabama, beginning Fall, 1983

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> All that remains, then, is to recapitulate what has been said . . . In this review, you begin by noting that you have done what you undertook to do. So then you must state what you have said, and why you have said it. One way of doing this is by a comparison of your opponent's arguments with your own . . . Thus: 'My opponent said this, and I that, on this point, and my reasons were these.' You may in fitting style close your speech with an asyndeton; it will mark off the epilogue as a true peroration. 'I have done; you all have heard; you have the facts; give your judgement.'
>
> -Aristotle, Rhetoric

To the student of deliberative rhetoric, Aristotle conveyed some rather sound advice. Perhaps most relevant to current-day deliberative efforts is the notion that the participants have a responsibility to provide the critic with a comparison of arguments and a rationale for argument choice and selection. That is, the notion of the activity as a reason-giving transaction between participants and critic should arouse little dispute. Of current interest in our writings in this area are the philosophical and theoretical frameworks which provide us with the parameters for the choices of arguments made and decisions rendered by critics: the debate paradigms. There is a growing concensus that there is dissension regarding the actual structure, function, and methods of evaluating our paradigms. Disputes range from the incorporation of the term itself, its relationship to "in-round" activities, and the role it serves as a guide for adjudication. This exploratory essay seeks to provide: 1) an examination of current perceptions of the structure and function of debate judging paradigms, 2) an investigation of the relationship between paradigms and communication rule structures, and 3) an advance-

ment of some of the pedagogical and theoretical ramifications of the approach developed in sections one and two.

Debate Paradigms--or--Through a Glass Darkly

Drawing upon the perspective of Thomas S. Kuhn, introduced in his second edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolution,[1] several debate authors have advanced the position that a paradigm is an accepted model or pattern used to guide the investigation and advancement of theory development. From a debating standpoint, the paradigms serve as a guide for the development of arguments and strategic choices made during the round itself. From a judging standpoint, many would contend that paradigms provide the critic with an evaluative framework for adjudication. Robert C. Rowland has indicated, for example, that "not only do debate paradigms provide the standards by which judges evaluate debates, but paradigms actually determine what the judge perceives."[2]

However, there is a growing dissension regarding concept, structure, and function of debate paradigms. The turmoil begins with selection of the term 'paradigm'. Patricia Riley and Thomas Hollihan have indicated:

> 'Paradigm,' as used in intercollegiate debate, we argue, bears little resemblance to the term derived from studying the philosophy of science.
> . . . While nothing is inherently wrong with borrowing, there are often difficulties which arise in translating concepts or practices from one theoretical context to another.
> . . . Our point, however, is that these 'paradigms' are often not paradigms at all. The problem is not just the dual usage of the term--confusing disciplinary matrices and exemplars--that has created problems, but the analogy between science and nonscience disciplines is not fully explicated.[3]

Confusion over the actual function of paradigms is also escalating. Rowland would contend that paradigms provide judges with standards for evaluation and serve to explicate rule structures that guide the debaters

actions during their quest for ballots.[4] However, it does not, to this author, appear that each paradigm clearly presents a critic with an extant rule structure nor a clear framework for evaluation. Citing Kuhn, Randall A. Lake has explained that:

> . . . to determine what paradigm scientists share is not automatically to determine shared rules. 'Indeed, the existence of a paradigm need not even imply that any full set of rules exists.' Thus, Kuhn contends, paradigms can guide the progress of 'normal science' in the absence of rules; however, rules become important when paradigms become insecure.[5]

Lake is correct, in my opinion, when he points out that debate theory appears to be in such a predicament:

> To the extent that a comparison with science is at all valid, whether our situation is more akin to 'pre-paradigm' or 'revolutionary' scinece, it seems clear that we are not in a period of 'normal' science. Our debate 'paradigms' are insecure.[6]

Whether or not our lexicon has been appropriately selected will not be resolved in this essay. I predict that this debate will continue in our theory writings. At issue here is the predictive value of our paradigms "in practice." Whereas at one time the paradigms may have been able to give us a clearer set of standards for evaluation and an extant rule structure to guide "in round" argument choice and strategy selection, this does not seem to be the case at present. A greater number of judges are unwilling to impose a paradigm on the debate round. In fact, a 1981 survey conducted by Austin Freely revealed that 92% of the coaches and 100% of the guest judges at the National Debate Tournament preferred that the debaters select the paradigm to be used for adjudication.[7] Although we should realize that this is a selective sample, it does, I believe, reflect a growing trend in collegiate debate. The impetus for the increased flexibility on the part of our debate critics is not altogether clear.

Perhaps, it stems in part from a realization that our paradigms do not provide us with a clear concensual framework by which we may adjudicate a round. There exists today, a great deal of conceptual slippage in the actual application of our paradigms. As a case in point, let us consider the results of an analysis of judging philosophies in academic debate conducted by John D. Cross and Ronald J. Matlon.[8] Their study examined judge reactions to specific episodes covering eight concepts: 1) presumption, 2) conditional/hypothetical analysis, 3) contradiction management, 4) skills vs. issues, 5) probable truth, 6) inherency-causality, 7) comparison of systems, and 8) interjection of theoretical perspectives in a round of debate. Respondents were presented with "in round" situations regarding argument choice and strategy selection concerning each of the eight concepts. They were then asked to indicate there decision and the reasons why they considered that choice correct in each instance. Two important conclusions were drawn from the study:

> First, the majority of judges in the academic debate community view debates with extraordinary concensus regardless of their stated judging philosophies. Because judges tend to stray from their stated philosophical inclinations, judging philosophies actually lack systematic rigor in their application. [Second], . . . judges have shown a willingness to accept many new theoretical arguments in a debate if the theory is cogently defended by the team presenting it. If this judicial liberalism continues, it may make our current concern over judging philosophies irrelevant.[9]

The conclusions of the survey were supported more recently by J. W. Patterson and David Zarefsky when they explained that, "most judges work within whatever paradigm emerges in the debate itself, and what emerges often is not a pure form of any of these paradigms but, rather, a hybrid of several."[10] Riley and Hollihan have also noted that, ". . . it is the mixing of these models and the disappearance of standardized criteria which are the hallmarks

of the 'everything is debatable' new paradigm/communication style."[11] Lake has remarked that, ". . . paradigms are ambiguous and can be interpreted or operationalized in diverse ways . . ."[12]

It is becoming increasingly clearer that our paradigms are, as Kuhn says, insecure. In practice, they do not appear to be providing our community with clear standards for evaluation. As we as judge(s) become more flexible with our attitude that "anything is debatable," new theory positions arise that our quasi-standardized paradigms are not equipped, at present, to handle. The debate round is increasing in complexity as a form of communicative/argumentative interaction. As theorists, we appear to have fallen behind the times in regard to an examination of how our paradigms should guide our adjudication of more recent theoretical advancements presented "in round" for our listening pleasure. Phenomena such as counter-warrants, add-ons, turnarounds, topicality standards, etc., appear to cut across the preview of our paradigms yet have not been addressed by the historic authors of our respective paradigms. At this time, two options appear to present themselves for our consideration: 1) as 'paradigm' theorists, we would need to explicate a much broader standardized rule structure for each of our paradigms. Given the periodic inability of our community to agree upon the structure and function of the respective paradigms, this alternative would appear to be a seemingly insurmountable task; 2) we can examine ways of harnessing the in round creativity we are subjected to by enhancing the communication competence of our debaters. That is, if we are reluctant to accept the task fo explicating standardized paradigmatic rule structures, (a task many would view as an undesirable restriction on in-round creativity),[13] then we need to teach our debaters how to better coordinate and manage the development of theory arguments within the

round itself. It is with this second option that the next section of this essay is concerned.

The Apples and Oranges of Rule Theory

Kuhn has indicated that rules become more important when paradigms become insecure.[14] That theorists in our field have realized this to be a statement worthy of consideration may be witnessed in recent writings on the relationship between rules and paradigms.[15] Of major importance for our discussion here is the fact that the majority of writings on rules present them, theoretically, as though only a singular type of rules exist. By and large, the writings reflect rules as defined by Shimanoff and others as ". . . a followable prescription that indicates what behavior is obligated, preferred, or prohibited in certain contexts."[16] It is important to note these theorists view rules as "out there," rules are outside the parameters of the behavioral context and are imposed upon the actors. They also view the context as "given," as opposed to being "created" through the communication of the actors. On the other hand, some view rules as cognitive in nature, internalized. The latter of the two groups of theorists perceive that rules are used to negotiate and create a context through the communication which takes place. The communicative acts which take place within the episode serve to explicate the rule structures and resulting expectations creating a context.[17] The first type of rules depend upon social concensus for their creation and maintenance. Debate theorists who dismiss this type of rule as an inadequate tool for the debate context are, in my opinion, correct. They point to an inability on the part of the debate community to formulate a concensual rule structure for our paradigms[18] and indicate that such an approach could stiffle in-round creativity and testing

of debate theory.[19] The residents of our debate community are in favor of allowing the debate context to provide the testing ground for new ideas and issues of debate theory and practice. It follows logically, then, that we, as coaches, should do our best to ensure that the context is utilized in a professional and responsible manner. It is with this task that this section of my essay is concerned.

It is my opinion that current-day debate rounds frequently suffer from a lack of perceptual management. That is to say that many debaters assume that their judge's perception of the arguments and strategies implemented in the round will reflect their own. This position hinges upon the notion that there exists a shared, concensual, a-priori perceptual framework for evaluation. We as coaches have also fallen prey to this rather naive perspective on occasion. For example, most of us have been confronted with a situation where a team asks us what to argue for a specific judge. At times, our response may include a comment that this judge is, for example, a "policy maker" and that they should "adapt accordingly." After the round, however, we may find that the team "debated for a policy maker," yet still lost. We should take a less macroscopic view of this problem by realizing that what we are really confronted with is the responsibility to address this issue from a "meaning coordination standpoint." That is, we should realize that we are dealing with an information-processing episode and perhaps a number of individualized perceptions as to what policy making actually entails.[20] (The first portion of this essay should have made clear the dangers of assuming a concensual, a-priori framework for evaluation among the participants in the round). The debate round itself should be viewed as a preparadigmatic setting, initially void of any clear, precise, socially agreed upon evaluative framework. The task of those involved in

the round should be to coordinate and negotiate the management of meaning within the round itself to provide a clearer perceptual and evaluative framework from which to operate. Jack Rhodes has indicated that, "we have taught the debaters the lexicon of paradigms, hypothesis-testing, policy making, and so forth; but we seem not to have taught them just how to use these terms to full impact in the rounds."[21] For example, a year ago I had the opportunity to judge a semi-final round at a gracious tournament hosted in the south. During the course of the round, the negative team opted to run counter-warrants. Constructive speeches were over and as of yet, no paradigm for evaluation had been introduced. The first affirmative rebuttalist announced, without explanation as to a rationale for his choice, that the negative team's approach "forced" them to become hypothesis testers and proceeded to 'hold forth' with new resolutional alternatives. By the end of the round I had several yellow pages of transcribed oral hieroglyphics in front of me, void of any conveyed meaning in light of the paradigm I was to use to evaluate the round. The reservation I had with this approach was not that it was illegitimate <u>per se</u>, but that absent was any indication from the participants as to what I was to do with these arguments. The round become overly <u>enthymematic</u> in nature. That is, the affirmative assumed that I would obviously put the round together in a manner consistent with their uncommunicated perception as to why this novel approach justified a decision for them. I am sure we have all had similar, equally frustrating experiences. Without a clearly communicated framework for evaluation the arguments become what one eastern coach has termed "mindless incantations." At one time, we could apparently rely on our paradigms to provide us our perceptual framework for argument choice and evaluation. In thoery, most paradigm authors have provided us with a

starting point for a conceptual framework for the debate episode. In practice, however, we are straying from the predictive qualities of our paradigms as witnessed through the increased mixing and in-round development of hybrids that are taking place. So where are we to turn for solutions to this problem? To the scientific community which generated the lexicon which is, in part, responsible for our current state of confusion? I think not. One possibility, certainly not presented as the only one, is to turn to communication theory. Afterall, are we not dealing with what can be (perhaps at times loosely) referred to as communicative action? It is my belief that we could benefit from an examination of the communication theory advanced by W. Barnett Pearce and Vernon E. Cronen in Communication, Action, and Meaning: The Creation of Social Realities,[22] hereinafter referred to as CMM theory. Although some people may have reservations with identifying debate theory and practice with what some have termed an "interpersonal theory," I am attracted to it for what it has to offer from a 'meaning coordination' standpoint. As mentioned earlier, I believe that the primary problem with our debate rounds is not our attempts at creativity, but rather our apparent inability to harness it from a standpoint of perceptual management. If we can no longer rely on our paradigms for some degree of perceptual predictability, then we must insure that our debaters obtain an acquaintance with theories of perceptual management. CMM affords us an opportunity to examine such a theory. It would be impossible for me to thoroughly acquaint the reader with CMM theory. For that reason, I have selected portions of the approach which indicate, in part, what this unique communication theory would have to offer.

CMM theory describes human actors as attempting to achieve coordination by managing the ways messages take on meanings.[23] CMM theorists are attempting to explain the principles that make social coordination possible. The

debate round can be viewed as a complex form of social interaction, as a unique communication episode. According to Cronen, Pearce, and Harris, episodes are communicative routines that persons view as wholes. "Episodes are comprised of reciprocal speech acts and are characterized by their constitutive and regulative rules."[24] The importance of perceptual management within such a context is stressed by Cronen, et. al.:

> Because contexts (relationships, groups, institutions, etc.) are products of social action, a useful social theory should assist people in their management of context and meaning. The highest obligation of persons is that of taking responsibility for their parts in the cocreation, maintenance, and alteration of social orders. We are in basic agreement with Einstein, who says that "moral responsibility is man's awareness of his obligation to interact creatively with his fellow men without renouncing his individuality." Creative interaction presupposes the ability to manage meanings. We cannot choose whether or not to manage meaning. (emphasis mine)[25]

We are painfully aware that in those debate rounds where creative interaction occurs, void of the management of meanings, that the outcome is not often successful or predictable. A very wise director of forensics has often said that, at times, "choice is tragic." It is becoming increasingly clearer to the debate community that the by-product of complex interaction absent perceptual management, is confusion. Cronen, et. al., explain that ". . . confusion is sometimes a necessary precondition for altering a destructive social pattern."[26] Riley and Hollihan have taken the position that ". . . the tension felt in the debate community, purportedly over 'competing paradigms,' is more correctly the tension over exemplars in the new communication style introducing both interesting and exciting innovations--e.g., the notion that debate can be a testing ground for academic and social theories of argument--and introducing influences which severely threaten the academic viability of the entire activity . . ."[27]

It is my belief that our new-found flexibility, absent an increased competence in perceptual management, may well decrease the epistemic quality of our activity.

One way of restoring manageability to the debate round, as a complex communication episode, is to examine the rule structures associated with the coordination and management of meanings. CMM is often referred to as 'Rules Theory.' However, its concept of rules is unique. Cronen et. al., have explained:

> . . . our concept of rules is unique. It does not limit the concept of rules to shared meanings, and it is not based on the principles of von Wright's practical syllogism. In CMM theory, rules are organizations of cognitions. They exist in the heads of individual social actors . . . Two types of rules are identified: constitutive and regulative.[28]

Constitutive rules govern the assignment of meaning, and regulative rules indicate that in the context of certain social action, if given antecedent conditions obtain, then there exists some degree of force for or against the performance of subsequent actions. Constitutive rules, from a debate standpoint would serve as a guide to describe how the participants construct meaning within a praticular paradigm or exemplar. Regulative rules, in regard to participants in-round performance, would provide parameters for acceptable strategic choices or appropriate actions within a given emergent paradigm. What is currently missing in debate rounds is an explication of the constitutive and regulative rule structures of the participants. Those who would be concerned that debate over issues would be displaced by debate over rules[29] should realize that that objection is not entirely applicable here. Explication of constitutive and regulative structures could be handled easily through a simple utterance of "this is what I <u>mean</u> and this is <u>why</u> I chose to argue as I did." (In practice, this extension presents

the advice Aristotle gave to participants of deliberative rhetoric so very long ago). This approach would certainly be a step in the right direction. It would restore some of the perceptual management which has seemingly vanished from our debate episodes. For judges who desire the debaters to establish a framework for evaluation within the round, it affords the debaters with a mechanism for the creation and management of the meanings which would then serve as a guide for adjudication. The communication competence of the debaters would be enhanced. Their actions could be better coordinated through an understanding of the prefigurative and practical logical force of the explicated regulative rule structure. Cronen et. al. explain:

> Within the overall logical force of regulative rules, two sets of variables can be identified: prefigurative and practical. Prefigurative forces refer to the actor's conception of the episode, the meaning of prior speech acts, range of alternative actions, and other conceptions of the state of affairs, prior to action, that configure the choice of action. Practical force refers to actor's adjustments of their choices of action to anticipated consequences and to feedback received from actions.[30]

The authors of CMM go on to explain that the strength of these prefigurative and practical forces may be asymetrical. That is, "actors may feel their acts to be strongly determined by prefigurative forces, while the actors pay little attention to the consequences of the chosen acts."[31] It would appear that this is the case in many of our debate episodes currently. Of greatest importance here is the notion that an acquaintence with CMM theory could help us restore the coordination, negotiation and management of meaning within our debate rounds. An increased familiarity with how we process information and how we create and manage meanings could enhance the epistemic function of our activity and preserve the debate laboratory as a testing ground for new ideas and

theory.

The main thing to keep in mind is that what our debate paradigms and arguments mean is an inherently cognitive process. The meanings reside, not in debate texts or journal articles, but in the heads of the actors involved in the complex communication episode. CMM is informed by the idea that meanings are cognitive and context-dependent. The position is advanced that conversant's meanings function within hierarchical levels of organization. While the actual number of levels is indeterminate, they offer a useful idealization of six basic levels of meaning. The levels are:

1. Content Level — Content level meaning describes the referential function of verbal and nonverbal communication.[32] Content refers to the referential cognitive processes by which individuals organize and interpret the world as it is ultimately perceived[33] In the debate round, this level would describe the contents of arguments, e.g. "Naval bases in the Carribean are necessary for hemispheric defense."

2. Speech Acts — Speech acts are the things one person does to another person by saying something. They include such things as threat, promise, advice, insult, compliment, and so forth.[34] In the context of the debate round, this level would pretain to the various argument types.

3. Episodes — These are defined as "communicative routines which communicators view as distinct wholes, separate from other types of discourse, characterized by special rules of speech and nonverbal behavior and often distinguished by clearly recognizable opening or closing sequences."[35] They appear as patterned sequences of reciprocal speech acts. This level would, of course, depict the debate round itself.

4. Relationship Level -- Relationships are conversants' definitions of the bonds between themselves and others.[36] The meaning of an episode would be dependent upon the perceived relationship. This level would characterize the perceived relationship between the judge/critic and the debaters and among the debaters.

5. Life Scripts -- Life-scripts refer to that repertoire of episodes that a person perceives as identified with him/herself, the array of interactive situations that are consistent with a recognition of "this is me" or "this is something I would do."[37] This level, in a debate round, would influence the perceived role of the judge and the

debaters. For example, the perceived burdens of the affirmative or negative based upon their cognition of what role the judge is assuming for a given round. The same would be true for the judges' cognition of the perceived argumentative burdens for each team based upon his/her perception of their role in a given round.

6. Culrural Archetypes/Patterns -- Archetypes are at the highest level of the hierarchy.[38] There are a number of archetypal patterns persons draw upon as they aggregate episodes into relationships, relationships into life scripts, and so on.[39] In the debate context, paradigms would be viewed as forms of archetypal patterns of the debate community.

Constitutive rules with which participants' construct meanings and regulative rules which guide their actions organize the various levels of the hierarchy of meanings.

An acquaintence with these ideal typical levels, in relation to debaters and critics, may provide us greater insight into what is actually going on inside the actor's heads during the round itself.

Pedagocial and Theoretical Implications

As coaches, we have a responsibility to help our debaters maintain the epistemic value and integrity of our activity. It appears that we need to acquaint them with tools of perceptual management.

By instructing our debaters on how to coordinate the management of meaning in a round we can enhance their communication competence[40] by making them more aware of what the information processing venture actually entails. It is hoped that this would enhance their understanding of how to use and argue for emergent paradigms and associated rule structures. A better understanding of CMM theory could also serve to make the debate episode less enigmatic by making the debaters more responsible for the acts they perform. A clearer communication of their "RFD" could make ours much easier to put together as we sit at our motel tables late at night.

It is hypothesized that an increased understanding of communication action and the coordinated management of meaning should lead to a decrease in the "randomness" that currently plagues many of our debate rounds during the course of a season. It is my belief that "randomness" is most often the result of a lack of a clear conceptual framework for the interpretation and implementation of communicative behavior within the debate round as an inherently complex social act.

From a theory standpoint, the approach affords us with an opportunity to increase the quality and clarity of our attempts to introduce and test new developments in the round itself. It may be that we could eventually expand and clarify the structure and function of our debate paradigms through increasing our debate about them in a more responsible, coodinated fashion.

The impact that an acquaintance with CMM theory would have on our activity is, of course, unclear. One thing is, however, all too clear. Confusion in our activity is increasing as our debate rounds increase in complexity. We must accept our responsibility as coaches to explore alternative means of guiding our in-round creativity. Perhaps Gregory Bateson said it best: "rigor alone is paralytic death, but imagination alone is insanity."[41]

Endnotes

[1]Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

[2]Robert Rowland, "Standards for Paradigm Evaluation." Journal of the American Forensic Association 18 (Winter 1982): 133.

[3]Patricia Riley and Thomas A. Hollihan, "Paradigms as Eristic: A Changed Element in Intercollegiate Debate," paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Louisville, Kentucky, November, 1982, pp. 1-3.

[4]Rowland, p. 134.

[5]Randall A. Lake, "Debunking the Metaphor of the 'Paradigm,'" paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Louisville, Kentucky, November, 1982, p. 2.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Austin J. Freely, "Judging Paradigms: The Impact of the Critic on Argument," in George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes, eds., Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation, SCA, Annandale, VA., 1981, pp. 433-447.

[8]John D. Cross and Ronald J. Matlon, "An Analysis of Judging Philosophies in Academic Debate." Journal of the American Forensic Association 15 (Fall 1978): 110-123.

[9]Ibid., p. 123.

[10]J. W. Patterson and David Zarefsky, Contemporary Debate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1983), pp. 298-299.

[11]Riley and Hollihan, p. 7. It should be noted that the authors also provide us with a stimulating examination of 'paradigms' as differing communication styles.

[12]Lake, p. 3.

[13]For a discussion of the detrimental consequences of overly-standardized rule structures consult: G. Thomas Goodnight, "The Re-Union of Argumentation and Debate Theory," in George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes, eds., Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation, SCA, Annandale, VA, 1981, pp. 415-432. Walter Ulrich, "Flexibility in Paradigm Evaluation," Journal of The American Forensic Association 18 (Winter 1982): 151-153.

[14]Kuhn, p. 47.

[15]Articles already referenced above which discuss this relationship include those authored by Rowland, Ulrich, Goodnight, Lake, Riley and Hollihan. In addition, consult: Robert Trapp, "A Situationally-Guided Perspective for Propositions of Judgment," paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Washington, D.C., December, 1977. Thomas J. Hynes, an untitled paper discussing the relationship of rules and paradigms, presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Louisville, Kentucky, November, 1982. For a continuation of the discussion of the relation of paradigms to the debate round the reader is also encouraged to see: David Zarefsky, "The Perils of Assessing Paradigms," and Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer, "Policy Dispute And Paradigm Evaluation: A Response to Rowland," both articles in Journal of the American Forensic Association (Winter 1982): 141-145; 145-150.

[16]Susan Shimanoff, Communication Rules (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1980), p. 57. Additional discussions of this approach to rules theory can be found in: Donald P. Cushman, "Rules Theory: The Next Decade," paper presented at the Central States Speech Convention, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1982. Keith Adler, "An Evaluation of the Practical Syllogism as a Model of Man for Human Communication Research," Communication Quarterly, 26 (Summer 1978): 8-18. Donald P. Cushman, "The Rules Perspective as a Theoretical Basis for the Study of Human Communication," Communication Quarterly, 25 (Winter 1977): 30-45. D.P. Cushman and W. Barnett Pearce, "Generality and Necessity in Three Types of Human Communication Theory--Special Attention To Rules Theory," Human Communication Research 3 (1977): 344-353. D.P. Cushman and Gordon C. Whiting, "An Approach to Communication Theory: Toward Concensus on Rules," Journal of Communication 22 (1972): 217-238.

[17]I am grateful to Dr. Ken Johnson for this explanation of the two separate schools of thought. Personal communication with Johnson, 8 June 1982.

[18]Lake, p. 3.

[19]Goodnight, pp. 424-425. In addition, consult: Trapp, pp. 9-11.

[20]For a detailed discussion of this particular paradigm the reader is encouraged to consult: Alan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Roher, "The Logic of Policy Dispute," Journal of The American Forensic Association 16 (Spring 1980): 236-247.

[21]Jack Rhodes, "Argument Paradigms and Judge Adaptation," paper presented to the Speech Communication Association Convention, Anaheim, California, November, 1981, p. 4.

[22]W. Barnett Pearce and Vernon E. Cronen, Communication, Action and Meaning: The Creation of Social Realities (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980). For a synopsis of CMM, the reader is encouraged to consult: Vernon E. Cronen, W. Barnett Pearce and Linda M. Harris, "The Coordinated Management of Meaning: A Theory of Communication," in Human Communication Theory, ed. by Frank E.X. Dance (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), pp. 61-89.

[23]Cronen, Pearce, and Harris, p. 68.

[24]Ibid., p. 71.

[25]Ibid., p. 69.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Riley and Hollihan, p. 9.

[28]Cronen, et. al., p. 73.

[29]This is examined in greater detail in the paper presented in Louisville by Hynes.

[30]Cronen, et. al., p. 77.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Ibid., p. 71.

[33]Pearce and Cronen, p. 130.

[34]Ibid., p. 132.

[35]Cronen, et. al., p. 72.

[36]Ibid.

[37]Pearce and Cronen, p. 136.

[38]Ibid., p. 137.

[39]Cronen, et. al., p. 72.

[40]A more thorough discussion of this notion is provided in Cronen et. al., pp. 82-84. Specific development of the concept is provided by Harris. A more detailed discussion of how the concept can be examined in the debate context is the subject of a future essay that I am currently working on in conjunction with my dissertation at the University of Kansas. The reader is also referred to Chapter Six in Pearce and Cronen's seminal text.

[41]Cronen, et. al., p. 70.